The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions to which the agent assigns resiliently high credence. The stability rule generates a class of $\textit{probabilistically stable belief revision}$ operators, which capture the dynamics of belief that result from an agent updating their credences through Bayesian conditioning while complying with the stability rule for their all-or-nothing beliefs. In this paper, we prove a representation theorem that yields a complete characterisation of such probabilistically stable revision operators and provides a `qualitative' selection function semantics for the (non-monotonic) logic of probabilistically stable belief revision. Drawing on the theory of comparative probability orders, this result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a selection function to be representable as a strongest-stable-set operator on a finite probability space. The resulting logic of probabilistically stable belief revision exhibits strong monotonicity properties while failing the AGM belief revision postulates and satisfying only very weak forms of case reasoning. In showing the main theorem, we prove two results of independent interest to the theory of comparative probability: the first provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the joint representation of a pair of (respectively, strict and non-strict) comparative probability orders. The second result provides a method for axiomatising the logic of ratio comparisons of the form ``event $A$ is at least $k$ times more likely than event $B$''. In addition to these measurement-theoretic applications, we point out two applications of our main result to the theory of simple voting games and to revealed preference theory.

Despite efforts to better understand the constraints that operate on single-step parallel (aka "package", "multiple") revision, very little work has been carried out on how to extend the model to the iterated case. A recent paper by Delgrande & Jin outlines a range of relevant rationality postulates. While many of these are plausible, they lack an underlying unifying explanation. We draw on recent work on iterated parallel contraction to offer a general method for extending serial iterated belief revision operators to handle parallel change. This method, based on a family of order aggregators known as TeamQueue aggregators, provides a principled way to recover the independently plausible properties that can be found in the literature, without yielding the more dubious ones.

Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to multiple revision operators that all satisfy the rules under the same belief condition. In many practical applications, such as safety critical ones, it is important to specify a definite revision operator to enable agents to iteratively revise their beliefs in a deterministic way. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for iterated belief revision by characterizing belief information through preference relations. Semantically, both beliefs and new evidence are represented as belief algebras, which provide a rich and expressive foundation for belief revision. Building on traditional revision rules, we introduce additional postulates for revision with belief algebra, including an upper-bound constraint on the outcomes of revision. We prove that the revision result is uniquely determined given the current belief state and new evidence. Furthermore, to make the framework more useful in practice, we develop a particular algorithm for performing the proposed revision process. We argue that this approach may offer a more predictable and principled method for belief revision, making it suitable for real-world applications.

We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators does not include any AGM revision operators. We extend the class of credibility-limited revision operators in a way that all AGM revision operators are included while keeping the original spirit of credibility-limited revision. Extended credibility-limited revision operators are defined axiomatically. A semantic characterization of extended credibility-limited revision operators that employ total preorders on possible worlds is presented.

As AI models become ever more complex and intertwined in humans' daily lives, greater levels of interactivity of explainable AI (XAI) methods are needed. In this paper, we propose the use of belief change theory as a formal foundation for operators that model the incorporation of new information, i.e. user feedback in interactive XAI, to logical representations of data-driven classifiers. We argue that this type of formalisation provides a framework and a methodology to develop interactive explanations in a principled manner, providing warranted behaviour and favouring transparency and accountability of such interactions. Concretely, we first define a novel, logic-based formalism to represent explanatory information shared between humans and machines. We then consider real world scenarios for interactive XAI, with different prioritisations of new and existing knowledge, where our formalism may be instantiated. Finally, we analyse a core set of belief change postulates, discussing their suitability for our real world settings and pointing to particular challenges that may require the relaxation or reinterpretation of some of the theoretical assumptions underlying existing operators.

This paper studies the realizability of belief revision and belief contraction operators in epistemic spaces. We observe that AGM revision and AGM contraction operators for epistemic spaces are only realizable in precisely determined epistemic spaces. We define the class of linear change operators, a special kind of maxichoice operator. When AGM revision, respectively, AGM contraction, is realizable, linear change operators are a canonical realization.

In belief revision, agents typically modify their beliefs when they receive some new piece of information that is in conflict with them. The guiding principle behind most belief revision frameworks is that of minimalism, which advocates minimal changes to existing beliefs. However, minimalism may not necessarily capture the nuanced ways in which human agents reevaluate and modify their beliefs. In contrast, the explanatory hypothesis indicates that people are inherently driven to seek explanations for inconsistencies, thereby striving for explanatory coherence rather than minimal changes when revising beliefs. Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. Motivated by the explanatory hypothesis, we first present a novel, yet simple belief revision operator that, given a belief base and an explanation for an explanandum, it revises the belief bases in a manner that preserves the explanandum and is not necessarily minimal. We call this operator explanation-based belief revision. Second, we conduct two human-subject studies to empirically validate our approach and investigate belief revision behavior in real-world scenarios. Our findings support the explanatory hypothesis and provide insights into the strategies people employ when resolving inconsistencies.

Even if much has been written about ingredients that trigger laughter, researchers are still far from having completely understood their interplay in the cognitive process that leads a listener to guffaw at a pun or a joke. They are even farther from a detailed analysis and modeling of the mechanisms that are at work in this process. However, in recent articles Dupin de Saint-Cyr and Prade (2020, 2022) took a first step in this direction by laying bare that a belief revision mechanism was solicited in the reception of a narrative joke. Namely the punchline, which triggers a revision, is both surprising and explains perfectly what was reported in the beginning of the joke. A similar idea has been more informally proposed in Ritchie (2002). It is quite clear that this is insufficient for characterizing a narrative joke.

Two level credibility-limited revision is a non-prioritized revision operation. When revising by a two level credibility-limited revision, two levels of credibility and one level of incredibility are considered. When revising by a sentence at the highest level of credibility, the operator behaves as a standard revision, if the sentence is at the second level of credibility, then the outcome of the revision process coincides with a standard contraction by the negation of that sentence. If the sentence is not credible, then the original belief set remains unchanged. In this paper, we propose a construction for two level credibility-limited revision operators based on Grove's systems of spheres and present an axiomatic characterization for these operators.

Modal logics have proved useful for many reasoning tasks in symbolic artificial intelligence (AI), such as belief revision, spatial reasoning, among others. On the other hand, mathematical morphology (MM) is a theory for non-linear analysis of structures, that was widely developed and applied in image analysis. Its mathematical bases rely on algebra, complete lattices, topology. Strong links have been established between MM and mathematical logics, mostly modal logics. In this paper, we propose to further develop and generalize this link between mathematical morphology and modal logic from a topos perspective, i.e. categorial structures generalizing space, and connecting logics, sets and topology. Furthermore, we rely on the internal language and logic of topos. We define structuring elements, dilations and erosions as morphisms. Then we introduce the notion of structuring neighborhoods, and show that the dilations and erosions based on them lead to a constructive modal logic, for which a sound and complete proof system is proposed. We then show that the modal logic thus defined (called morpho-logic here), is well adapted to define concrete and efficient operators for revision, merging, and abduction of new knowledge, or even spatial reasoning.